William Lane Craig has many arguments for the existence of God, and one of them is the ontological argument. He actually uses Plantinga’s ontological argument. I would have to say that the ontological argument is his weakest though since it can be easily turned around to prove that God doesn’t exist. This may be why he doesn’t always use it in debates.
William Lane Craig’s Ontological Argument
The ontological argument is a method of trying to prove the existence of God with pure logic. This just isn’t possible though, and I can show why in a couple of ways.
The argument:
- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.
Now, logically this is sound. It violates no laws of logic whatsoever, so since that is the case, it must be true right? I have been asked why Craig would assert that a maximally great being must exist in all possible worlds, and that is simply because if it couldn’t exist in some possible world, it would not be maximally great because something greater could be imagined, like a being that would exist in all possible worlds.
Well, let’s see what else we can prove with this argument. What about our friendly neighborhood coffee pot that is the explanation for all the missing socks that you never find.
- It is possible that a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists.
- If it is possible that a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists, then a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in some possible world.
- If a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in some possible world, then a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in every possible world.
- If a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in every possible world, a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in the actual world.
- If a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists in the actual world, then a maximally great sock stealing coffee pot exists.
- Therefore maximally great sock stealing coffee pots exist.
Cool, that explains all your missing socks. Well, not really. This can also be worked in reverse. We can take the argument and make it show that God doesn’t exist too. Unfortunately in the same manner, the coffee pot loses its existence as well. (sad face)
- It is possible that a maximally great being does not exist.
- If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world.
- If a maximally great being does not exist in some possible world, then a maximally great being does not exist in any possible world.
- If a maximally great being does not exist in any possible world, a maximally great being cannot exist in the actual world.
- If a maximally great being cannot exist in the actual world, a maximally great being does not exist.
- Therefore, a maximally great being does not exist.
This is but one way that it can be stated, but it is still logically consistent. I can imagine many worlds where God is not necessary. I can simply imagine a world where nothing exists, and it does not contradict itself. Since it does not contradict itself, the rest of the proof stands.
Why is it wrong?
Well, this is a problem with modal logic. It is intended to be used by people that understand it, and people that don’t tend to think that this is a proper use of it.
Why is it faulty?
Well, these things are using modal logic. In modal logic, we have something called axiom S(5) which says that if something possibly exists, it possibly necessarily exists. That means that if you say something possibly exists, you are essentially saying that it does exist. So, by saying that a maximally great being is possible, you are saying that a maximally great being actually exists.
Now, what I did in my refutation showing that a maximally great being does not exist is to show that there is to conceive a world where a maximally great being does not exist. Because I can conceive of such a world and it is not contradictory, that means that a maximaly great being not only is not necessary, and therefore not logically possible, I also showed that if a maximally great being existed in some possible world, it didn’t hold that it could exist in all possible worlds. Since that is the case, a maximally great being could not exist because it would not be able to exist in every possible world, which would be required by a maximally great being.
Conclusion
So, what does this mean? Does God exist or does he not exist? Well, as always it can’t be proven one way or the other. Most philosophers would agree that you can’t prove anything with the ontological argument, although they may disagree as to why it doesn’t work. I would suggest that the ability of a world to exist without God shows pretty conclusively that a “necessary” being does not exist, since it would be necessary in all possible worlds. That would make God unnecessary and would help debunk many of the other arguments Craig makes.

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